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       Abstract:  
       This contribution focuses on the concept of bounded rationality, highlighting the role of 
psychology in the economic decisions. The work analyzes Simon’s approach and his notion 
of bounded rationality as procedural rationality. Moreover, it examines some major 
contributions of behavioral economics concerning cognitive biases, stressing the importance 
of the institutional structure in the decision process. The paper also survey  the literature of 
behavioral finance which has become  fashionable in explaining the anomalies of financial 
markets, pointing out also its limits.  
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       1. Introduction1  
 
       The present work criticizes the classical theory of rational choice pointing out its 
failures, highlighting the approach that seeks to combine economics and psychology. 
In particular, this contribution first analyzes the concept of bounded rationality devised 
by Herbert Simon. In Simon’s view the rationality of the individual is bounded, since 
the quality of information used is poor and the cognitive capacity of the individual is 
limited. So the individual can make decisions that appear irrational from the 
perspective of conventional economic wisdom. However, these decisions are typically 
the right ones for the individual making them. Moreover, the paper analyzes the 
approach of behavioral economics which has grown in importance since the 
seventies. This approach marks a return to reality from the rational optimizing model 
as the only framework for economics, and it also undelines that the human actions 
are heavily influenced by frames of reference. Thus behavioral economics maintains 
that institutional structure that individuals have is the basic framework for all of our 
economic decisions. Finally, the work refers to the literature of behavioral finance 
which has become widespread in explaining the behavior and the anomalies of 
financial markets and its crises, pointing out also its limits.  
                                                          
1 I wish to thank Mario Graziano for the helpful discussions and observations. The author is solely 
responsible for the errors and opinions expressed.   
  
 
       2. ‘Perfect’ rationality and expected utility theory 
 
        Rationality in neoclassical economics is represented by perfect rationality and it is 
interpreted in terms of consistency not of substance. The agents are rational if they have a 
coherent criterion of choice. The consistency of the choices implies that the agents are 
represented by a system of preference. Economics describes the choice as a rational process 
driven by a single cognitive process that includes the principles of the theory of rational 
choice and it orders the decisions on the basis of their subjective expected utility. In this view 
the individual  has a complete knowledge and is fully rational, while his economic choices, 
guided by his perfect rationality, are self contained in the economic sphere without affecting 
other aspects, such as the emotions, or being influenced by the environment2.  
 
       2.1    The expected utility theory 
 
        A cornerstone of the classical theory of rational choice is the expected utility theory, 
which deals with the analysis of choices among risky alternatives. 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) proposed their analysis of choice under uncertainty, 
which depends on strong assumptions of a psychological nature. The rationality is 
represented by the maximization of the expected utility, that is a criterion that facilitates 
choice under risk.  
According to von Neumann and Morgenstern, individuals generally move in the reality 
following predetermined patterns of behavior, at the base of which there is the assumption 
that they always prefer to have a greater wealth than less. The theory studies the preferences 
underlying consumer behavior under risk, i.e. when the subject is asked to make a decision 
without knowing with certainty which ex ante state of the world will happen, but he knows the 
probability distribution, that is, it is known to him a list of possible events, each of which he 
associates a probability of occurrence. This theory assumes that each individual has stable 
and consistent preferences, and that he makes decisions based on the principle of 
maximization of subjective expected utility. So given a set of options and beliefs expressed in 
probabilistic terms, it is assumed that the individual maximizes the expected value of a utility 
function u (.). The individual uses probability estimates and utility values as elements of 
calculation to maximize his expected utility function. Thus he evaluates the relevant 
probabilities and utilities on the basis of his personal opinion but also using all relevant 
information available. 
von Neumann and Morgenstern have proposed a well-known theorem in which they make the 
construction of an expected utility function possible. Any individual acting to maximize the 
expectation of a function u(.) will obey to four axioms, which are: completeness, transitivity, 
continuity, and independence3. The first two axioms, completeness and transitivity, require 
                                                          
2 Hogarth and Reder (1986) argue that the paradigm of rational choice provides economics with a unity 
that is lacking in psychology. 
3 The expected utility function can take three forms: is concave when describing the preferences of a 
risk averse individual; it is convex type when describing the preferences of an individual willing to risk; 
it is linear when describing the preferences of a risk-neutral individual. In the von Neumann-
Morgenstern framework, we can define individual's attitudes towards risk  without making any prior 
assumptions about his behavior. 
 respectively that an individual has well defined preferences, which are therefore complete, 
and that preference is consistent across any three options, so the consistency requirement 
reminds us that intransitive preferences lead to irrational behavior. 
The von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem is also based on a third axiom of continuity which 
states that the preferences of rational agents are ordered and without points of discontinuity. 
This axiom implies that for each P, Q, R  ∈ ι ,  if the lottery P is preferred to Q and Q to R , 
then exist  ∈ (0,1) such that you can construct a linear combination of P and R for which 
 
 αP + (1 ) R  Q  P + (1- )R 
 
The fourth axiom of independence is crucial, it assumes that a preference holds 
independently of the possibility of another outcome. For each P, Q, R  ∈ ι ,  if P  Q  R, 
and for each  ∈ (0,1)  
 
P  Q  P + (1  ) R  Q + (1  )R 
 
The expected utility theory has been generally accepted as a normative model of rational 
choice, defining which decisions are rational. If an individual does not maximize his expected 
utility he is designed to violate in his choices some precise axiomatic principles, which are 
rationally binding. This theory has also been applied as a descriptive model of economic 
behavior (Friedman and Savage, 1948; Arrow, 1971) so as to constitute an important 
reference model for economic theory. Thus the standard idea of rationality in economics is 
represented by the maximazation of subjective expected utility, which is “a combination of von 
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences and a Bayesian belief structure” (Kahneman, 2003, 
p.163). 
 
       3.  Psychology and economics: a challenging relationship 
  
        During the fifties there have been important explorations along the boundaries between 
economics and psychology. In particular, experimental psychology, concerned with the study 
of actual behavior and aware of the complexity of choices, had  highlighted the systematic 
(and unconscious) divergence of human behavior from the postulates of economic rationality. 
Some economists using experimental results questioned the validity of the classical model of 
rational choice (Simon, 1959). Thus a new line of research, called behavioral economics, 
started to be developed, trying to relate psychological factors to economic behavior (Rabin, 
1998).  One important contribution came from Herbert Simon's approach, that developed the 
notion of bounded rationality and the problem solving. Bounded rationality, in particular, 
depends – according to Simon (1972) – on the limits of attentive and computational capacity. 
Thus, he gave start to an approach based on the heuristics, that are interpreted as a trade-off 
between the limits of the human mind and the computing performance required by complex 
problems. Simon’s concept of bounded rationality can be interpreted – according to 
Kahneman (2003) – as defining a realistic normative standard for an organism with a finite 
mind. Simon essentially criticized – on the basis of analysis conducted on the field – the lack 
of realism of the neoclassical economic theory based on the assumption of full rationality. 
Another major contribution came from the pioneering experimental studies of Allais (1953), 
  
which have given a boost to the cognitive economic approach. Allais was investigating on the 
question if preferences are consistent with each other and with the axioms of rational choices. 
Allais’ studies demonstrated that preferences of individuals violate expected utility theory, so 
he proved the systematic discrepancy between the predictions of traditional decision theory 
and actual behavior. The results of laboratory experiments conducted by Allais have shown 
that individuals chose inconsistently and that they preferred solutions which did not maximize 
the expected utility. In this way Allais has demonstrated that the axiomatic definition of 
rationality did not allow to describe and even predict economic decisions4. 
Later, Ellsberg (1961) identified another paradox. He demonstrated another type of 
inconsistency in preferences, showing that individuals prefer to bet on a lottery with a chance 
of obtaining a win already known that on a lottery with ambiguous results. This aversion to 
uncertainty (ambiguity) of the individual is completely ignored in the expected utility model  
from a descriptive point of view, while is not considered acceptable from a normative point of 
view.  
Other challenges to utility theory and to the inconsistency in preferences came from framing 
effects by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). 
 
 
       3.1.    Bounded rationality  
 
        Herbert Simon5 proposed the idea of bounded rationality as an alternative basis for the 
mathematical modeling of decision making. Simon has coined the term ‘bounded rationality’ 
in Models of Man (1957). In his view, rationality of individuals is limited by the information they 
have, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the finite amount of time they have to make 
decisions. Bounded rationality expresses the idea of the practical impossibility (not of the 
logical impossibility) of exercise of perfect (or ‘global’) rationality (Simon, 1955). Simon argues 
that most people are only partly rational while are emotional/irrational in the remaining part of 
their actions. He maintains that, although the classical theory with its assumptions of 
rationality is a powerful and useful tool, it fails to include some of the central problems of 
conflict and dynamics which economics has become more and more concerned with (Simon, 
1959, p.255). Simon identifies a variety of ways to assume limits of rationality such as risk 
and uncertainty, incomplete information about alternatives, complexity (1972, pp.163-164). 
Furthermore, he asserts that an individual who wants to behave rationally must consider not 
only the objective environment, but also the subjective environment (cognitive limitations); 
thus you need to know something about the perceptual and cognitive process of this rational 
individual. Simon, therefore, considers the psychological theory very important to enrich the 
analysis for a description of the process of choice in economics. This is why he adopts the 
notion of procedural rationality, a concept developed within psychology (Simon, 1976,1997), 
which depends on the process that generated it, so rationality is synonym of reasoning. 
According to Simon (1976, p.133), a search for procedural rationality is the search for 
computational efficiency, and a theory of procedural rationality is a theory of efficient 
                                                          
4 Maurice Allais presented in Paris, in 1952, his famous paradox to an audience composed of the best 
economist of his generation; among others, Kenneth Arrow, Paul Samuelson, Milton Friedman, Jacob 
Marschak, Oskar Morgenstern and Leonard Savage. 
5 Simon (1955, 1956, 1957, 1972, 1979, 1982, 1997). 
 computational procedures to find good solutions. Procedural rationality is a form of 
psychological rationality which constitutes the basic concept of Simon’s behavioral theory 
(Novarese, Castellani, Di Giovinazzo, 2009; Barros, 2010, Graziano, Schilirò, 2011; Schilirò, 
2012), in contrast to economic rationality, defined by Simon as ‘substantive rationality’. 
Another way to look at bounded rationality is that, because individuals lack the ability and 
resources to arrive at the optimal solution, they instead apply their rationality only after having 
greatly simplified the choices available. Actually, individuals face uncertainty about the future 
and costs in acquiring information in the present. These two factors limit the extent to which 
agents can make a fully rational decision. Thus – Simon claims – agents have only bounded 
rationality and are forced to make decisions not by 'maximization', but rather by satisficing , 
i.e. setting an aspiration level which, if achieved, they will be happy enough with, and if they 
don't, they try to change either their aspiration level or their decision. “The limits of human 
cognitive ability for discovering alternatives, calculating their outcome and making comparison  
may lead the decision maker to settle for some satisficing strategy” (Simon, 1982). Satisficing 
is the hypothesis that allows to the conception of diverse decision procedures and which 
permits rationality to operate in an open, not predetermined, space (Barros, 2010). Real-world 
decisions are made using fast heuristics, 'rules of thumb', that satisfice rather than maximize 
utility over the long run.  Therefore agents  use the heuristics to make decisions rather than a 
strict rigid rule of optimization. The agents do this because of the complexity of the situation, 
and their inability to process and compute the expected utility of every alternative action. In 
fact, there are limits in the attentive, mnemonic and computational capacity binding the 
computational load, hence the usefulness of automatic routines. Rationality is bounded by 
these internal constraints in the uncertain real world. Simon then relates the concept of 
bounded rationality to the complementary construct of procedural rationality, which is based 
on cognitive processes involving detailed empirical exploration and procedures (“search 
processes”) that are translated in algorithms. This is in contrast to the notion of perfect 
rationality, that is based on substantive rationality, which derives choices from deductive 
reasoning and from a tight system of axioms; an idea of rationality that has grown up strictly 
within economics (Simon, 1976, 1997).  
Simon does not reject completely the neoclassical theory, in fact he describes a number of 
dimensions along which neoclassical models of perfect rationality can be made somewhat 
more realistic, while sticking within the vein of fairly rigorous formalization. These include: 
limiting what sorts of utility functions there might be, recognizing the costs of gathering and 
processing information, the possibility of having a "multi-valued" utility function. However, 
although bounded rationality offers an alternative in the form of multi-level utility, the problem 
with bounded rationality is that it lacks mechanisms of comparison between alternatives. 
Simon’s work has been followed in the research on judgment and decision making, both in 
economics and psychology. Two major approaches produced important insights into 
perception mechanisms shaping the individual’s internal representation of the problem: the 
‘‘heuristics and biases” program (Kahneman, Tversky (K&T), 1972; Tversky, Kahneman 
(T&K), 1974)6, which has been fundamental to the contemporary development of behavioral 
                                                          
6 The literature on bias evidence is quite large. As stated by Conlisk (1996, p. 672): “the evidence 
suggests that the magnitude and nature of the errors are themselves systematically related to 
economic conditions such as delibaration cost, incentives, and experience. In this sense, investigation 
of bounded rationality is not a departure from economic reasoning, but a needed extension of it”. 
  
economics7. The other approach, derived from Simon’s work, is the ‘‘fast and frugal 
heuristics” program (Gigerenzer, Goldstein, 1996; Todd, Gigerenzer, 2003). 
Tversky and Kahneman (K&T, 1972; T&K, 1974, 1983) published a series of experiments in 
which they demonstrate significant deviations from the Bayesian theory of judgement under 
uncertainty. In a major article “Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases” published 
in Science they offered a theoretical explanation about the observed deviations from perfect 
rationality, noting that people rely on “heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of 
assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations” (T&K, 1974, 
p.1124). In other words, Tversky and Kahneman were arguing that heuristic short-cuts 
created probability judgements which deviated fron statistical principles. Moreover, these 
authors explored the psychology of intuitive beliefs and choices and examined their bounded 
rationality (Kahneman, 2002, p.449).  However, Tversky and Kahneman do not abandon the 
assumption that individuals are intelligent and intentional in making decisions, but they 
assume systematic and specific biases that move away the judgment from the perfect 
rationality of individuals. They highlighted that "failures" of perfect rationality depend on the 
specific ways in which people select and process the information mentally. Kahneman and 
Tversky (K&T, 1979, 1984; T&K, 1981, 1986) articulated a direct challenge to the rationality 
assumption itself, based on experimental demonstrations in which preferences were affected 
predictably by the framing of decision problems, or by the procedure used to elicit 
preferences8. One major conclusion of this alternative approach is that the susceptibility of 
people to framing effects violates a fundamental assumption of invariance.  Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979, 1984) also argued that any individual has a deformation of the probability, 
which is different between gains and losses and, moreover, the individual has aversion to 
losses.  A loss, in fact, is more weighted by a psychological point of view than a gain. 
Consequently, taking into account framing effects, aspects like loss-aversion, money illusion, 
etc. become relevant in strategic decision-making, macroeconomic phenomena and financial 
decisions, so the model of choice based on perfect rationality with its underlying expected 
utility theory fails as an adequate descriptive model of choice under risk9. 
Yet, critics have pointed out that behavioral economics is not a unified theory, but it is instead 
a collection of tools and ideas. This is true. But this is also true of neoclassical economics. 
However, as Kahneman admitted (2003, p.166), a real problem in economic theory is that 
models must satisfy the constraint of tractability when the assumptions are set forth. So, the 
models can become complex, but the number of parameters that can be added is small. In 
addition, theoretical innovation in behavioral economics tend to be noncumulative.  Despite 
this, one of the goals of behavioral economics is to develop better tools, but also normative 
rules that drive choice in desired directions (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2003; Shiller, 2005). 
                                                          
7 Behavioral economics aims at increasing the realism of the psychological underpinnings of 
economics analysis for generating theoretical insights, making better predictions and suggesting better 
policy (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2003). 
8 In their ‘Prospect theory’ Tversky and Kahneman have shown experimentally the presence of 
inconsistent judgments and choices by an individual facing the same problem presented in different 
frames (‘invariance of failures’). It follows that the frame, or the context of choice, coeteris paribus, 
helps to determine a different behavior.   
9 However, according to Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010, p.1399): “Although Kahneman and Tversky’s 
heuristics and biases program has survived substantial experimental scrutiny, models of heuristics 
have proved elusive”. 
 The other approach, derived from Simon’s work, is the ‘‘fast and frugal heuristics” program 
(Gigenzer, and Goldstein, 1996; Goldstein and  Gigerenzer, 2002; Todd and Gigerenzer, 
2003),  that is in contrast to the theoretical position of Tversky and Kahneman and the 
theoretical strands of behavioral economics which, showing the distortions of judgment and 
choice defined as cognitive biases, highlight the negative effects and the errors that these 
heuristics lead in the behavior and choices of individuals. Fast and frugal heuristics refer to 
simple, task-specific decision strategies that are part of a decision maker’s repertoire of 
cognitive strategies for solving judgment and decision tasks. Unlike many decision-making 
models in the behavioral sciences, models of fast and frugal heuristics describe not only the 
outcome of the decision-making process but also the process itself. Studies on fast and frugal 
heuristics include (a) the use of analytical methods and simulation studies to explore when 
and why heuristics perform well; and (b) experimental and observational studies to explore 
whether and when people actually use fast and frugal heuristics. Following Simon's notion of 
satisficing, Gigenzer and Goldstein (1996), for example, have proposed a family of algorithms 
based on a simple psychological mechanism: one-reason decision making. These fast and 
frugal algorithms violate fundamental tenets of classical rationality: they neither look up nor 
integrate all information (Gigenzer and Goldstein, 1996). The heuristics are determined by a 
trade-off between the limits of the human mind and the computing performance required by 
complex problems10. Each individual is a complex system operating in a complex 
environment interconnected by a system of relationships that change dynamically over time, 
the choices that each individual operates are choices with limited rationality. In the same way, 
the companies of all kinds are complex systems composed of individuals or complexing 
agents, their collective behavior is in turn influenced by the bounded rationality of its 
components, making them agents bounded rationality. These considerations (Gigerenzer, 
Hertwig and Pachur, 2011) give more confirmation that the understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying the behavior of individuals-agents are critical to the operation of the firm. The use 
and study of heuristics is therefore crucial to understand and operate in these uncertain, 
dynamic and highly interconnected contexts. At the same time the version of bounded 
rationality, coupled with insights from evolutionary psychology, put forward by Gigerenzer and 
Selten (2001) and by Todd and Gigerenzer (2003), gives a different grasp of the functional 
role of emotions within the human decision machinery. 
 
       4. Behavioral finance 
 
       To understand financial markets, traditional finance paradigm use models in which 
agents are perfectly or fully rational. Agents’ rationality means that when they receive new 
information, agents update their beliefs correctly, in the manner described by Bayes’ law. 
Moreover, given their beliefs, agents make choice that are normatively acceptable, in the 
sense that they are consistent with the notion of subjective expected utility, implying a 
preference-maximizing choice, so financial decisions for the rational agent are based on the 
hypothesis that they calculate their rational advantage and act consistently with that. 
                                                          
10 Empirical literature has indicated that humans use fast and frugal heuristics especially when under 
time pressure, when information search is costly,or when information has to be retrieved from memory. 
Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) maintain that Homo heuristicus has a biased mind and ignores part of 
the available information, yet a biased mind can handle uncertainty more efficiently and robustlythan 
an unbiased mind. 
  
According to Simon’s bounded rationality, individuals may not have the knowledge base to 
make ideal choices in finance-related matters. Following this view, financial decision making 
can be improved by providing individuals with better quality information presented in a 
non‐complex fashion and an institutional environment conducive to good decisions. 
Yet, research in psychology have supported the view that emotional reactions to situations 
involving uncertainty or futurity often differ sharply from cognitive assessments of those 
situations, and that when such differences occur, it is often the emotional reactions that 
determine behavior.  
From the seventies onwards there has been an increasing interest towards psychological and 
sociological aspects in the analysis of financial behavior. Then there has been the 
development of a new branch of finance: behavioral finance, which in itself combines aspects 
of cognitive psychology and financial theories in the strict sense. Behavioral finance argues 
that some financial phenomena can plausibly be understood using models in which some 
agents are not fully rational. One of the building blocks of behavioral finance is psychology. 
Then behavioral finance has become the study of the influence of psychology on the behavior 
of financial investors and the subsequent effect on markets.  
Behavioral finance is of interest because it helps explain why and how markets might be 
inefficient. In practice this new approach seeks to explain the so-called financial market 
“anomalies” by analyzing the deviation of financial agents’ behavior from full rationality and 
optimum choices. A way to overcome the limited or bounded rationality of the agents, also in 
financial markets, is to make use of rules of thumb. But, as highlighted by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974), «people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the 
complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental 
operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe 
and systematic errors» (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124).11 Thus, the adoption of 
heuristics by individuals can be necessary to solve the problems of everyday life, but in the 
financial sector it can lead to biases which have proved very expensive. However, behavioral 
finance make use of a set of tools that include susceptibility to frames and other cognitive 
errors, so that the institutional structure becomes relevant, but also tools that imply varying 
attitudes toward risk, aversion to regret and imperfect self-control. 
 
       4.1.  Behavioral finance: anomalies and biases 
 
        In the reality of financial markets, the fact that the price of a stock should coincide with 
its fundamental value seems to be more the exception than the rule. The "anomalies" in the 
behavior of prices and yields, in contrast to the hypothesis of efficient markets, are numerous 
and show that the securities are by no means in line with their fundamentals. 
The efficient market theory (Fama, 1970, 1991) asserts that financial markets are 
informationally efficient, that is markets are efficient in the sense of information if at all times 
the stock prices fully and correctly reflect all the available information12. This theory rests on 
                                                          
11 Tversky and Kahneman (1973) introduced the availability heuristic as “a judgmental heuristic in 
which a person evaluates the frequency of classes or the probability of events by availability, i.e. by the 
ease with which relevant instances come to mind.” The reliance on the availability heuristic leads to 
systematic biases. 
12 According to the efficient market hypothesis, “it was generally believed that securities markets were 
extremely efficient in reflecting information about individual stocks and about the stock market as a 
 the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which is based on three theoretical assumptions: i) 
market agents are perfectly rational and are able to value any security rationally; ii) even if 
there are some investors who are not rational, their trading activities will either cancel out one 
another or will be arbitraged away by rational investors; iii) market agents have well defined 
subjective utility functions which they will maximize. Consequently, the theoretical foundation 
of the EMH is the subjective utility theory. Thus, according the EMH, no investement strategy 
can earn average returns greater that are warrented for its risk (Barberis and Thaler, 2002). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) had already noticed that investors systematically violate 
Bayes’ rule and other maxims of probability theory in predicting uncertain outcomes. In 
forecasting future uncertain events investors usually focus on recent history and pay less 
attention to the possibility that such short history could be determined by chance13. 
In the eighties and nineties there have been a series of contributions in behavioral finance 
which have proposed models departing from economic rationality in specific contexts that 
explain a family of anomalies. These models do not abandon completely the rationality model 
as the basic framework, but they focus on some particular deviation explaining the anomalies. 
Behavioral finance, in fact, has argued that some features of asset prices are most plausibly 
interpreted as deviations from fundamental value, and that these deviations are brought about 
by the presence of traders that are not fully rational. For instance, the theory of market 
efficiency has been challenged by the discovery of some anomalies that would produce 
excess returns. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) in their seminal paper “Does the stock market 
overreact?”, discovered that people systematically overreacting to unexpected and dramatic 
news events results in substantial inefficiencies in the stock market. These authors have 
shown that bonds, characterized by particularly high yields (so-called winners), record in the 
aftermath the worst yield and vice versa. This depends on investors' overreaction to an event. 
Since investors count on the representative heuristic, they become too optimistic about recent 
winners and too pessimistic about recent losers. However, over the time the investors realize 
the error and correct their assessments causing a reversal of returns14. De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) made use in their paper of the notion of mental accounting which is the set of cognitive 
operations used by individuals and households to organize, evaluate and keep track of 
financial activities. Odean (1998,1999), instead, has found that investors tend to overestimate 
their ability and also the precision of their own private information. Odean finds that 
overconfident traders trade too much, lower their expected utility and increase volatility in the 
markets. So he has designed a stock market in which all traders are overconfident; these 
traders do not properly optimize their expected utility, which are therefore lower than if the 
                                                                                                                                                      
whole…The hypothesis is associated with the idea of a “random walk”, which is a term loosely used in 
the finance literature to characterize a price series where all subsequent price changes represent 
random departures from previous prices. The logic of the random walk idea is that if the flow of 
information is unimpeded and information is immediately reflected in stock prices, then tomorrow’s 
price change will reflect only tomorrow’s news and will be independent of the price changes today. But 
news is by definition unpredictable, and, thus, resulting price changes must be unpredictable and 
random” (Malkiel, 2003, p.59). 
13In a later paper Kahneman and Thaler (2006) reviewing a wide empirical literature in behavioral 
economics noticed that since often forecasts are systematically biased, then choices may 
systematically fail to maximize utility. 
14  In a subsequent article De Bondt and Thaler (1987) provide additional evidence that supports the 
overreaction hypothesis. 
  
traders were rational. A consequence of this behavior is that overconfident traders hold 
underdiversified portfolios (Odean, 1998, p. 1912). At the same time, Barberis, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998), adopting a quasi-Bayesian approach15, present a model of investor sentiment 
that displays underreaction of stock prices to news such as earnings announcements in the 
short run and overreaction of stock prices to a series of good or bad news in the  long run. 
Another important aspect hilighted in behavioral finance is loss-aversion. Bernatzi and Thaler 
(1995) presented a model of a stock market in which investors are assumed to be “loss-
averse”, meaning that they are distinctly more sensitive to losses than to gains. In this model 
agents are taking into account of interdependencies between decisions. Another assumption 
of the model is that even long-term investors are assumed to evaluate their portfolios 
frequently. Thus they define the combination of these two assumptions “myopic loss-
aversion”. The aim of this contribution is to explain the equity premium puzzle by myopic loss-
aversion, adopting an alternative preference structure to the standard expected utility-
maximizing paradigm (Bernatzi and Thaler, 1995, p.90). 
As we mentioned in the section II.2., Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their prospect theory, 
acknowledging the bounded rationality of individuals, offered a descriptive model of risky 
choice in which the carries of utility are not states of wealth, but gains and losses relative to a 
neutral reference point. The most distinctive predictions of the theory arise from a property of 
preferences called loss-aversion (Kahneman, 2003, p.164), which indicates the disparity the 
strong aversion to losses relative to a reference point and the weaker desire for gains of 
equivalent magnitude. In other words, the loss-aversion of an individual is related to the fact 
that the sensation of loss relative to status quo and other reference points looms very large 
relatively to gains. This sensation of loss has been identified and emphasized in a great deal 
of experimental work, thus loss-aversion proves to be more realistic than the standard 
continuous, concave, utility function over wealth (Rabin, 2002a). Thaler (1980) was the first to 
extend the idea of loss-aversion to riskless choice. He used loss-aversion to explain the 
endowement effect – the discrepancy between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept 
for the same good –. Also, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991) analyzed the topic of loss-
aversion16, exploring other implications. They carried out a significant experiment based on 
the “endowment effect” where these authors demonstrated that the individuals feel a great 
sorrow when they lose the objects they possess, more than the pleasure would cause them to 
acquire those same objects, if they do not already possess them. So, the “endowment effect” 
is an anomaly that causes a statu quo bias (a preference for the current state that biases the 
individual against both buying and selling his object). The “endowment effect” is connected to 
the particularly pervasive phenomenon of loss-aversion, for which the disutility of a loss is 
greater than the utility of a win of the same size. 
Loss-aversion contributes to stickiness in markets, because loss-averse agents are much 
less prone to exchanges than final-states agents (Kahneman, 2003). Thus, in the field of 
behavioral finance the loss-aversion appears to manifest itself in the investor behavior as an 
                                                          
15 A “quasi-Bayesian” approach assumes that people misspecify a set of hypotheses, or enconde new 
evidence incorrectly, but otherwise use Bayes’ rule. See, for instance, the model of Rabin (2002) on 
the “law of small numbers”. 
16 The loss-aversion is a core aspects of agent’s reference-based preferences and it is related to the 
fact that the sensation of loss relative to status quo and other reference points looms very large 
relatively to gains. This sensation of loss has been identified and emphasized in a great deal of 
experimental work (Rabin, 2002a, p.9). 
 unwillingness to sell assets or other securities, if doing so forces the investor to achieve a 
nominal loss. This loss-aversion can help to explain why housing market prices do not adjust 
downwards during periods of low demand with the relative drying up of sales since the agents 
are unwilling to accept losses relative to an existing reference price (Genesove and Mayer, 
2001) 17. Barberis and Huang (2008) also provided a model incorporating loss aversion and 
framing into asset pricing to understand the equity premium puzzle. 
Furthermore, Thaler and Shefrin (1981)18, who gave major contributions to behavioral 
finance, presented their behavioral life-cycle theory arguing that economists who wish to 
analyze the consumption-saving decision must address the bounded rationality and 
impatience of consumers. In their models, self-control is an acknowledged problem19. 
According to the behavioral-life cycle theory models, consumers are responding to 
psychological limitations by adopting rules-of-thumb, such as mental accounts (as in De 
Bondt and Thaler, 1985), that are used to constrain the decision making of the myopic agent. 
Mental accounting is a useful way to describe the rules which govern gain/loss integration 
(Thaler, 1999). It predicts that people will spend money coming from different sources in 
different ways. Mental accounting stands in opposition to the standard view in economics that 
money is fungible. 
Several criticisms have been made to behavioral finance. One is that theoretical behavioral 
models are somewhat as hoc and designed to explain specific stylized facts. This may be 
true, but these models are based on how agents actually behave, and their behaviors have 
been studied on extensive experimental evidence, so these models are able to explain 
evidence in financial markets better than traditional models. Another important criticism and 
often recurring is that behavioral finance presents no unified theory unlike expected utility 
theory maximization using rational beliefs. But the normative property of the traditionl theory 
cannot justify its limitations; moreover behavioral finance proved to be able in helping us 
understanding financial phenomena (Subrahmanyam, 2008). 
 
 
       5. Conclusion  
            
       Psychology and economics have provided wide-ranging evidence and robust empirical 
findings that bounded rationality is crucial, so this notion represents a reference point for 
understanding economic behavior and economic choices. This paper argued that we can 
enrich our knowledge of the complex reality of financial markets through the fertile 
contribution of Simon’ approach and of behavioral finance. The work also examined some 
                                                          
17 The literature of behavioral finance includes the lack of symmetry between decisions to acquire and 
maintain resources and the strong aversion to the loss of some (emotionally) valuable resources that 
could be completely lost. 
18 See also Thaler and Shefrin (1988) and Thaler (2003).  
19 Thaler (1981), discussed the theory of intertemporal choice and tested the model porposed in Thaler 
and Shefrin (1981) in which the hypothesis was that the discount rate will vary inversely with the size of 
the reward for which the individual must wait. This hypothesis is derived from viewing intertemporal 
choice as problem in self-control. In fact, waiting for a reward requires some mental effort. If this effort 
does not increase proportionally with the size of the rewards ( if there are some fixed psychics to 
waiting) then the hypothesized result will be present.(Thaler, 1981, p. 202). Thaler (1981) also showed 
that gains and losses of different absolute magnitudes are discounted differently. 
  
major contributions of behavioral finance which have highlighted failures in the taditional 
theory of rational investor, but also anomalies and biases in the behavior of financial markets 
that can lead to financial crises. A consequence of this analysis is that economics should 
aspire of making assumptions about human behavior as realistic as possible on a 
psychological level and that individuals with bounded rationality must be provided with better 
quality information presented in a non-complex fashion and an institutional environment 
conducive to good decisions, since the latter constitutes the basic framework for all economic 
decisions.   
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